As support for populist parties continues to surge worldwide, a growing number of policymakers, academics, and civil society organisations are pointing to the importance of social and cultural infrastructure as a way of tackling the erosion of social cohesion, a growing sense of pessimism, and an increasing distrust in mainstream political parties – the conditions in which populism thrives. In this blog, Rosa Marks explores the role social and cultural infrastructure could play in combatting this threat in the UK.
The last few years have witnessed rising support for populist parties and politicians around the world, as demonstrated by the election of leaders like Trump, Meloni, and Lula da Silva, the candidacy of Democrat Mamdani for mayor of New York City, and the growing success of Reform in the United Kingdom (UK). Observers have attributed these political developments to a number of factors, from economic insecurity and rising inequality, to declining trust in (political) institutions and the loss of social cohesion. Consequently, policymakers, academics, and civil society organisations are paying increasing attention to social and cultural infrastructure, with its perceived capacity to foster community resilience and tackle socioeconomic inequality, as a way of tempering growing support for anti-establishment parties. Just a few weeks ago, for example, a number of Labour MPs urged Rachel Reeves to invest in “grassroots ‘social infrastructure’”, such as community centres and libraries, to ensure that all voters see benefits from the government’s plan for growth announced in the wake of Reform’s strong performance in the local elections in May 2025.
There is much evidence to suggest that social and cultural infrastructure does have important economic, social, and civic benefits. Libraries, museums, and other social and cultural assets can boost local skills and reinvigorate local high streets by encouraging people to spend time and money in the local area. They can promote both physical and mental wellbeing and serve as crucial community hubs, particularly during times of crisis. Social spaces, institutions, and networks may also improve political and civic engagement, with recent polling published by Power to Change suggesting a correlation between involvement with associational organisations and trust in democratic institutions and mainstream political parties.
The values that good-quality social and cultural provision create may provide an important bulwark against the pessimism and sense of grievance which populist parties mobilise and benefit from. Many studies, for example, have illustrated the role that social and cultural spaces can play in fostering the kinds of social attitudes and values that are most conducive to feelings of civic pride and democratic efficacy. On the flipside, some scholars argue that people who are less engaged in social activities and have fewer social interactions are more likely to lack a strong attachment to social and political institutions, have less trust in others, and feel alienated from mainstream politics, resulting in an increased tendency to support anti-establishment parties. While the association between social isolation and support for populism remains hotly contested, there is a wealth of literature showing the impact of spaces like parks, cafés, and museums on reducing social isolation and loneliness.
Equally, the closure of social and cultural spaces, such as libraries, youth centres, and pubs, in recent years has been linked to support for populist parties. Whilst this may be in part because the reduction of social and cultural provision has led to a decline in the activities outlined above that may mitigate against extremism, the symbolic effect of its decline also has an impact. Economist Thiemo Fetzer recently wrote in The Conversation that the physical decay of social infrastructure is a “visible sign of institutional failure” and “systemic neglect, reinforcing the perception that mainstream parties have abandoned these communities”. This follows the recent publication of his study showing a positive correlation between high street vacancy rates and support for UK Independent Party (UKIP) support, which Power to Change consequently built on with their own analysis, which found an association between the decline of high streets and support for Reform. Similar research has also been undertaken with regards to GP practices, which has shown that their closure has a direct influence on support for right-wing populism, particularly in areas that have experienced significant demographic change as a result of immigration. In mainland Europe, too, academics have demonstrated a correlation between the closure of local social amenities, such as cinemas and grocery shops, and support for right-wing populism.
Beyond a general sense of decline, the disappearance of social and cultural provision can also lead to a sense of the loss of cultural and historical identity, particularly in “left-behind areas”, where local amenities and institutions often take on additional meaning and emotional significance. The closure of social spaces can spark a sense of neglect and grievance amongst their users who, on occasions, feel a lack of respect for parts of their national cultural heritage. And this may also fuel support for (right-wing) populism, as Diane Bolet found in her study of pub closures and support for UKIP in the 2000s and 2010s.
Populists have not just stood back and watched these sentiments grow. As sites where “locally-specific struggles over meaning and value take place”, some activists have referenced declines in social and cultural provision as tools to appeal to voters who “feel like stranger[s] in [their] own community”. In 2023, Spain’s hard-right populist VOX party, for instance, launched their “Take care of what belongs to you” campaign, which involved candidates walking around working class areas of Madrid, stopping in traditional markets, pubs, and local shops, and using them to create an “idea of what an authentic neighbourhood should be, and appealing to sentiments of ‘community loss’ and ‘cultural backlash’”. Equally, research into the activities of the British National Party (BNP) has shown that that one of the party’s most successful electoral periods in the early 2000s involved local activism focused on community infrastructure, for instance, through sponsoring local pub football teams or litter-picking efforts in public spaces.
Social and cultural infrastructure not only provides a focus for populist narratives but also a physical space for political activism and community self-organisation. Scholars of progressive social movements have long recognised the importance of local social institutions, such as neighbourhood clubs and community churches, to political organising. Writing in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States (US), Aldon Morris, for instance, emphasised the role that churches, schools, clubs, and other forms of local association enabled previously isolated rural African Americans to congregate, discuss common grievances, and plan collective actions. However, there is little equivalent research about right-wing populist activism. One notable exception is research by Béla Greskovits, which demonstrates how the conservative Civic Circles Movement in Hungary used “community gathering places” – such as clubs, churches, and cultural centres – for its political activities and to mobilise civil society, which has proved crucial to the enduring political rule of Viktor Orbán. And, in light of the recent upsurge in support for Reform in the UK, some journalists have picked up on the party’s use of social and cultural spaces, particularly in the North of England. In May 2025, for example, several British newspapers reported on the rebranding of the Talbot in Blackpool, which has become the first Reform UK pub, though Hope not Hate have pointed out that the pub has long been host to neo-Nazi speakers, concerts, and conferences. Other journalists have referenced the use of pubs and working men’s clubs by Reform activists, including Farage himself, who used a speech in Newton Aycliffe Working Men’s Club to declare Reform to be the party for the working class in the lead-up to the 2025 local elections.
So where does this leave policymakers and politicians who are keen to fight the rising tide of populism? Clearly investment in improved community provision is not a silver bullet. However, as Mark Fabian points out in a recent blog, the success of far-right populism is the result of “palpable community decay and feelings of social abandonment”. And, as the Local Government Association recognised as far back as 2011, “for many the most visible signs of diminishing community spirit’ are the ‘loss of pubs and social clubs, post offices, and local bakers or butchers… or boarded up outlets that no one wants to rent.”
More research is certainly needed to improve our understanding of the relationship between populist politics and levels of social and cultural provision in places. But in light of the very real prospect of Reform becoming the second main party of British politics, policymakers would do well to heed the advice of those calling for greater attention and investment to be paid to the infrastructures and assets that prop up the lives of communities and citizens across the UK.
The views and opinions expressed in this post are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Bennett Institute for Public Policy.
