Drawing on a new report from the Bennett Institute for Public Policy and PolicyWISE, Alex Walker and Michael Kenny set out why the Council of the Nations and Regions matters for devolution in times of political fragmentation and what’s needed to make it work.
Back in autumn last year, the UK government convened the inaugural meeting of a novel initiative which was to play a key role in its ‘reset’ of relations with the devolved governments and plans to expand English devolution. The first meeting of the Council of the Nations and Regions – a forum bringing together the UK Prime Minister, devolved leaders and England’s regional mayors – met with relatively little fanfare during the government’s honeymoon period.
Now its next meeting is imminent, and the context has shifted substantially. The government’s popularity has nosedived and it is reeling from a poor performance in the local elections earlier this month, which included, for the first time, the election of two Reform UK mayors. They will take their seats on the Council – which is now a much more fragmented body politically than when it was established. This may be uncomfortable for many of the forum’s other participants, and there are likely to be growing concerns that the government has handed its opponents a platform. Yet this more challenging political context arguably makes the Council more necessary. Rather than responding by making this a half-baked initiative, the government should focus on ensuring it is meaningful and effective.
The UK has lacked effective mechanisms for collaboration between its different governments
Devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in the late 1990s was not accompanied by much interest in the kinds of mechanisms of ‘shared rule’ present in other multi-level states. The potential need for structured forms of cooperation and coordination was largely overlooked. A Joint Ministerial Committee was set up at the time as a forum for semi-regular discussion, but it fell into disuse at the top-level and was widely seen as ineffective.
Jumping forward to more turbulent times, the twin crises of Brexit and the Covid pandemic highlighted the weakness of existing structures for coordination and managing disagreement. A new machinery of intergovernmental relations was agreed in 2022 after a lengthy joint review process. This was a significant improvement on the previous system and involved the prospect of more regularised interaction, a more jointly accountable administrative system, and an independent dispute resolution process.
But this new system did not really get into gear, with its top-level forum meeting only once before the Conservatives left office. And despite the expansion of English devolution to new areas under Johnson, it involved no role for the growing cohort of regional mayors – who had very visibly lacked a line of communication with the British centre during Covid. There was (and is) therefore still a gap to be filled by a top-level political vehicle focused on collaboration involving all of the governments and authorities across the UK with devolved responsibilities.
There is a good case for including the mayors in the UK’s intergovernmental relations machinery
England’s mayoral authorities differ significantly from the devolved governments in constitutional standing, powers, accountabilities and budgets. This raises the question: does it make sense to bring them together in one forum? Whilst these discrepancies raise challenges, there are benefits to including the English mayors. If this is to be a setting in which major challenges for the UK as a whole are discussed, it will be valuable for the UK government to hear the perspectives of England’s major cities and rural areas. There are also benefits to bringing the mayors into closer contact with the heads of the devolved governments. This is especially the case where they are in proximity to one another and there are potential cross-border issues around transport and infrastructure to be managed.
Having regional leaders present in this forum also allows for some representation for England (albeit at present only certain parts of England) that is distinct from the UK government. This may enable the UK government to adopt a slightly different role, one where it ‘holds the ring’ and acts for the strategic interests of the UK as a whole. In general, though, the UK government needs to be clearer about when it is acting as the de facto government for England.
A more co-produced approach is needed for a more turbulent political context
The first meeting of the Council took place in a context of unusual political alignment, with only four non-Labour figures around the table. Following the recent mayoral elections, this has now gone up to seven – including the two new Reform UK mayors – making the spread of political opinion much wider. This is likely to place a strain on the informal and collegial approach that characterised the meeting last autumn. There is a risk that the Council becomes a setting in which participants give set piece contributions aimed at scoring political points, airing grievances or presenting demands to the Prime Minister. However, there are actions that can be taken now to prevent this direction of travel.
While political differences undoubtedly make intergovernmental cooperation more challenging, formal structures are even more important in this context – as informal party channels cannot be relied on to manage coordination between different levels of government. However, if they are seen as the creature of one particular government, then representatives of other political parties are less likely to engage constructively and will instead use them for their own political purposes (if at all).
The Council of the Nations and Regions is a UK government initiative – and has its origins in a review of the constitution conducted by former PM Gordon Brown for Labour in opposition. Given these origins, the Council needs to evolve into more of a jointly owned initiative. The Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat, which is staffed by officials from across the four governments, could take on the administration of the Council, for example. And more effort should be made to involve all of its participants in determining its agenda and activity.
The Council needs to show that cooperation can enable better delivery
The most important road to success for the Council is for it to make a tangible and meaningful difference. And for this it needs to be connected to delivery. Despite the heightened political disagreement coming down the track, there are still many shared aims – for example, around productivity and economic growth. Higher growth is a cross-cutting challenge involving a range of policy levers over which influence and control are dispersed. Many contemporary policy problems are similarly complex and multi-faceted. The different governments and authorities across the UK need to recognise that in order to achieve many of their core objectives, they need to work with others. If the Council becomes an enabler for this kind of collaboration – from exchanging lessons to substantive joint initiatives – then it may get the buy-in it needs to become an established feature of the governance landscape.
However, this will require some give and take from all sides. The UK government will need to cede some ownership. And it could be more ambitious when it comes to the agenda – for example, tabling discussions on foreign policy when there are big geopolitical shifts requiring a strategic response, as has happened recently in Canada. But making this work is a two-way street. Devolved leaders also need to engage constructively, including with those from different political parties. Nervousness about the Council is understandable. But bodies like this are a necessary and important part of making devolution work, and have been a crucial missing ingredient in the past. Now is not the time to get cold feet.
Read the report: Why the UK’s Council of the Nations and Regions matters
Image: By Scottish Government – Council of the Nations and Regions, CC BY 2.0
The views and opinions expressed in this post are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Bennett Institute for Public Policy.
